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Executive Summary  
As health reform moves forward, the medi-
cal loss ratio (MLR), designed to indicate how 
much of the premiums collected from consum-
ers actually pay for health care services and 
clinical quality, will take on new significance for 
plans competing in health insurance markets. 
Plans that do not meet minimum statutory 
MLR standards will be required to provide 
rebates to enrollees. For the individual market, 
the law gives the secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) the author-
ity to make adjustments to the MLR standard if 
she determines that it may destabilize a state’s 
health insurance market. 
The MLR requirements for rebates go into 
effect Jan. 1, 2011, while the broader mar-
ket reforms including guaranteed issue and 
elimination of medical underwriting will not 
be implemented until 2014.  Market analysts, 
industry representatives and actuaries, and 
regulators participating in a one-day meet-
ing conducted by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation’s Changes in Health Care Financing 
and Organization (HCFO) initiative generally 
anticipate that, after an initial period when many 
insurers will experience significant uncertainty, 
most of the large, established carriers offering 
coverage in the individual market will be able 
to meet the MLR thresholds, but other insur-
ers may leave the market. In the short term, the 
greatest opportunities for improving the MLR 
may be reducing distribution costs, but the con-
tractual ability available to do so may be limited. 
If insurers choose to terminate product lines 
or withdraw entirely from the market before 
2014, some consumers may be unable to find 
affordable alternative coverage. Meeting partici-
pants estimated that up to one fourth of people 
whose primary insurance coverage is purchased 
in the individual market might be at increased 
risk of losing or needing to change coverage 
during the transition period, and that some pro-
portion of these could be “stranded,” i.e. unable 
to obtain replacement coverage.
Meeting participants identified warning signs of 
market destabilization that could inform policy-
makers’ determinations about market stability. 
Some focus directly on market contraction, 
(e.g., carriers reducing marketing or products, 
surrendering licenses, closing blocks of business, 
or arranging for assumption reinsurance) and 
others on market volatility (e.g., large changes in 
premiums, shifts in marketing strategies, com-
plaints to state regulatory agencies, and demo-
graphic changes in coverage or access). During 
the transition period, the absence of consistent 
definitions and lack of complete, reliable data, 
and, more importantly, reductions in the types 
of insurance products available to consumers in 
the individual markets in each state will mean 
that regulators will need to apply substantial 
judgment, rooted in an understanding of local 
circumstances, to appropriately recognize when 
a market is at risk of destabilizing. Participants 
also identified a variety of approaches that states 
have taken in the individual markets that might 
protect consumers stranded by contraction of 
individual insurance options in the 2011-2013 
period.  Examples of such protections include 
extending continuous coverage protection to 
consumers stranded by market exits, guaranteed 
issue for some individuals for some products, 
designating “insurers of last resort,” requiring 
HMOs to offer some form of individual cover-
age, requiring carriers with blocks of other types 
of business to continue marketing individual 
coverage, and opening state high-risk pools to 
all qualified uninsured individuals, not just those 
who are medically eligible. Better understand-
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ing of these policies and how well they have 
worked could help state and federal poli-
cymakers to be ready if individual markets 
cannot meet consumer needs.  States, with 
the help of the federal government, will 
need to craft policies that address problems 
that may occur during the next few years 
without undermining broader goals of insur-
ance reforms that will be in place by 2014. 
Overview
As health reform moves forward, the medi-
cal loss ratio (MLR) will become a critical 
measure of efficiency for health plans 
competing in health insurance markets. The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA) enacted on March 23, 2010, 
requires insurers, beginning Sept. 23, 2010, 
to submit annual reports summarizing their 
MLR experience. Based on this information, 
insurers who do not meet the minimum 
standards set out in the legislation — 85 
percent in the large group market; 80 per-
cent in the small group and individual mar-
kets — must provide rebates to enrollees 
for plan years beginning Jan. 1, 2011.  
As defined in the law, the MLR for pur-
poses of rebate calculation is the ratio of:
Expenditures on reimbursement for clinical 
services and activities that improve health care 
quality,
to:
Total amount of premium revenue, excluding 
taxes and fees, and after payments or receipts 
for risk adjustment, risk corridors, and rein-
surance (as defined in the PPACA).
The PPACA charges the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) with developing standards and def-
initions associated with the law’s MLR pro-
visions. Working through the wide range 
of technical issues involves understanding 
the huge variation in insurance markets and 
regulatory systems that developed across 
the states over decades, as well as the poli-
cy goals and potential consequences of the 
PPACA reforms. 
For the individual market, the law gives the 
HHS secretary the authority to “adjust [the 
minimum MLR] percentage with respect to a 
State if the Secretary determines the applica-
tion of such 80 percent may destabilize the 
individual market in such State.” Determining 
how the new MLR provisions, in conjunction 
with the wide range of coverage and benefit 
reforms included in the PPACA may affect 
health insurance markets and the consum-
ers who depend on those markets, poses a 
particularly challenging task. In June 2010, 
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s 
Changes in Health Care Financing and 
Organization (HCFO) Initiative convened 
a meeting designed to foster discussion by 
experts focused on the relationship between 
MLRs and the stability, or destabilization, of 
insurance markets.1 The meeting focused on 
key policy, research, and regulatory questions, 
including:
• What do we know about the relationship 
between MLR standards and insurance 
market stability? What do experts predict 
about the likely impact of the new MRL 
requirements on the individual insurance 
market?  
•  How, and how quickly, can insurers 
reduce administrative costs or other 
components to meet MLR thresholds 
established in the PPACA? What is 
known about the components of MLRs? 
How do the metrics vary across states or 
types of insurers? 
• How will regulators and policymak-
ers know when an insurance market 
becomes destabilized? What are the 
“early warning signs” of market desta-
bilization associated with MLR require-
ments? How can these be monitored or 
measured now? What infrastructure will 
be needed to track the effect of MLR 
standards over time?
MLR Requirements and Market 
Instability 
Wide variation in the structure and over-
sight of individual insurance across the 
states amplifies the challenges of under-
standing, or predicting, how MLR require-
ments will affect the availability or cost of 
individual insurance products. The MLR 
standards are only one of many factors that 
might affect insurers’ decisions to enter or 
leave markets, or how they manage exist-
ing blocks of business. Restrictions on 
rating and underwriting, new minimum 
benefit standards, administrative and 
reporting requirements, expanded access to 
Medicaid, subsidies available to low-income 
enrollees, exchanges that provide a new 
means of marketing, and the emergence 
or expansion of other types of plans (e.g., 
CO-OPs, multi-state plans, or association 
health plans), among other reforms, all 
may affect individual insurance markets in 
different ways within and across states and 
sub-state regions. And, because the MLR 
standards will be implemented before the 
other reforms are fully implemented in 
2014, there will be a transition period when 
existing plans are subject to the new MLR 
requirements that will be applied by the 
secretary based on experience that may be 
very different from what it will be several 
years from now.  
Market analysts, industry representatives, 
actuaries, and regulators participating in 
the HCFO meeting all indicated that they 
believed that most of the large, estab-
lished carriers offering coverage in the 
individual market will probably be able 
to meet the MLR thresholds. This would, 
however, depend on a range of assump-
tions. Regulations and guidance for cal-
culating MLRs are not yet available, and 
participants also cited a number of other 
factors that could affect carriers’ business 
decisions, such as the impact of the MLR 
definitions on health plan activities and 
investments related to quality, health IT, 
and protecting against fraud and abuse. 
One participant provided an analysis of 
NAIC data suggesting  that while a sig-
nificant number of carriers, mostly small 
companies, reported MLRs below the 
threshold (for 2008 experience), many were 
just below the required level of 80 percent.2 
Most, if not all of the publicly traded com-
panies and Blue Cross Blue Shield plans 
are expected to meet the standards within 
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a short period. A small number of large 
health plans with substantial enrollment 
in the individual market may be unable to 
meet the MLR threshold, at least in the 
short term.  Participants also believed that 
some companies unable to meet the 80 
percent threshold would seek to maintain 
their market position in order to gain new 
business in 2014, and would probably be 
more likely to work to minimize rebates to 
consumers than exit markets.
The transitional period, 2011-2013, cre-
ates special concerns for insurers and for 
consumers. Insurers are facing uncertainty 
about how the MLR standard will actually 
be defined and how it, along with other 
reform provisions, will affect their lines of 
business. For some consumers, significant 
disruption in the private insurance market 
could pose a serious problem. If insur-
ers choose to terminate product lines or 
withdraw entirely from the market before 
2014, enrollees who have pre-existing con-
ditions could, depending on the regulations 
in place in their state, be unable to find 
affordable alternative coverage.  
Meeting participants worked through an 
educated guess of the number of covered 
lives that could be stranded by the con-
traction of individual insurance options 
triggered by the MLR requirements in the 
2011-2013 period.  Assuming that about 
12-15 million people are covered at any 
point in time,3 and, based on industry esti-
mates, about three fourths of the covered 
lives are in the large, stable plans, some 
percentage of 3 to 4 million covered lives 
might be at increased risk of losing cover-
age from their current insurer because of 
firm exit from the market.  Some of these 
people will be able to obtain coverage 
from another source, but others might not 
be able to obtain replacement coverage 
because of pre-existing health conditions.  
Individual health insurance markets in most, 
if not all, states have been tightly underwrit-
ten. Obtaining affordable coverage in the 
individual market, particularly for people 
with pre-existing conditions, has been a seri-
ous problem in most states. The extent to 
which MLR requirements exacerbate these 
problems over the transitional period may 
be relatively small. But even a relatively 
small number of people stranded by loss 
of coverage in the individual market in the 
transition period would be highly problem-
atic, not only for them, but politically as 
well, if it were seen as a negative outcome 
of the federal health reform legislation.
What do we know about MLRs, and 
what the new standard might mean 
for markets and consumers?
Traditionally, MLRs have been important 
tools in the health regulation arena, partic-
ularly with respect to assessing health plan 
solvency, and have also been used to assess 
whether a proposed premium increase is 
warranted.4 Most states have some form 
of minimum loss requirements for health 
insurance plans in the individual market.5  
But while the current NAIC reporting sys-
tem collects MLR data, there are variations 
among state definitions and requirements, 
and the statutory definition in the PPACA 
differs in substantive ways from the defi-
nitions used by the states. States typically 
calculate MLR as incurred claims costs 
divided by earned premiums, with none or 
different variants of the adjustments for 
premiums for costs or taxes and fees, or 
costs related to improving quality that are 
set out in the PPACA.  
Although the regulations that will establish 
precisely how the MLR will be calculated 
have not been issued, there was general 
consensus among HCFO meeting partici-
pants that the inclusion of costs directed 
to improving quality of care and premium 
reductions for eliminating taxes will result 
in increases in the MLRs for some insurers, 
perhaps increasing the currently reported 
MLRs by approximately five percent. In 
the individual market, however, since plans 
underwrite for health reasons, the use of 
medical management activities, such as care 
coordination, may be lower than in group 
insurance (since underwritten members are 
healthier at policy issue), so impact of the 
new definition may be small, at least rela-
tive to the group product lines. 
Uncertainty surrounding MLR thresholds 
is a significant concern for insurers. Like 
other businesses, they need to plan strategi-
cally for changes in products, marketing 
approaches, and administrative and data 
systems that may take several years to imple-
ment. Generally, under HIPAA, insurers 
need to give six months advance notice 
before exiting a market. Therefore, decisions 
for 2011 need to be made by mid-2010.  
Some changes in benefit design could 
affect administrative costs; high deductible 
plans, for example, may have lower admin-
istrative costs since fewer small claims are 
processed, but higher percentage of fixed 
administrative costs per premium dollar.  
Making major changes in benefit design 
or marketing strategies for the transitional 
period could, however, be impractical, 
both in terms of the administrative costs 
involved and, depending on the regulatory 
requirements in place in the state, the time 
and effort involved in state filing and rate 
review. Changing products could also cre-
ate backlash with consumers in advance of 
the more sweeping changes that will come 
after the transition period, and may not be 
feasible in light of the implementation of 
several near-term PPACA provisions relat-
ing to coverage and benefits.
In the short term, the greatest opportuni-
ties for improving MLRs in the individual 
market may be reducing distribution costs, 
but the means available to do so may be 
limited. Lowering broker commissions, a 
relatively large component of administra-
tive costs in the individual market (more 
than 10 percent in some cases), may be 
constrained by existing contractual agree-
ments, and the willingness of brokers to 
accept large reductions in commissions 
in the market today. Meeting participants 
offered several different perspectives on 
the prospects of significant changes in the 
distribution costs in the individual market. 
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Some predicted that major reductions in 
broker commissions could destabilize the 
individual market. Brokers play an impor-
tant role in the individual market in many 
states, helping consumers to find products 
that are open to them and also to navigate 
the process of providing information and 
sometimes negotiating with carriers regard-
ing specific benefits, exclusions, riders, etc. 
From a longer-term business perspective, 
others suggested that broker commissions 
could be reduced without undermining 
the distribution system. Some noted that 
because commissions are based on the 
cost of the premium, brokers have been 
making more income, and will continue to 
make more per sale as the cost of insur-
ance increases.  Further, the influx of new 
enrollees would create new opportunities 
to increase sales (making up for lower 
commission rates per policy sold).  
The PPACA calls for the establishment of 
a network of state-based insurance market 
exchanges. The creation of the exchanges 
raises the prospect that over time, there could 
be significant changes in the organization and 
costs of the distribution channels in the indi-
vidual market. In Massachusetts, for example, 
where there is guaranteed issue, modified 
community rating, and a set of standard plan 
options, consumers sort through options 
without brokers in the individual market. The 
state’s Connector provides an on-line insur-
ance market.6 Greater standardization could 
facilitate the use of e-marketing of insurance, 
and the establishment of exchanges where 
consumers can compare plans could also lead 
to lower administrative costs. During the tran-
sition period, however, there will be consum-
ers in some, possibly many states who want to 
continue to work with brokers who can help 
them sort through coverage options subject to 
underwriting and rating and assist them with 
filling out the necessary paperwork. 
How will we know if individual 
insurance markets become  
unstable? 
Because MLR standards are intertwined with 
other dynamic factors shaping the individual 
insurance market, implementing the standards 
and making exceptions to them involves 
interrelated analytical tasks: 1) determining 
if there is currently an unacceptable level of 
instability in individual insurance markets; and 
2) determining what role the MLR standards 
play in the destabilization of individual insur-
ance markets.
There does not appear to be empirical evi-
dence supporting a particular formula for 
deciding how many carriers need to be in 
an individual group market serving a state, 
or part of a state. Some participants in 
the HCFO session generally agreed that a 
relatively small number of carriers—in the 
range of three to five—could be enough 
to support a functional state or regional 
individual insurance market if they pro-
vide a wide range of products. Some in 
fact argued that more than five would not 
provide additional stability, and that con-
sumers may actually prefer to have limited 
choice, as long as that choice included a range of 
plan options that meet their needs or expectations. 
In Washington state, for example, there are 
three commercial carriers7 actively serving 
the individual market. In 1999, these same 
carriers began leaving the individual market 
because of the significant adverse selection 
taking place. In 2001 the legislature passed 
individual market reforms that provided 
incentives to carriers to offer plans in the 
individual market. Those reforms included 
requiring consumers seeking coverage 
to fill out a health questionnaire; carriers 
are allowed to refer the 8 percent most 
costly applicants (based on their reported 
health experience) to the state’s high risk 
pool. Consumers are also subject to a 
nine month pre-existing condition wait-
ing period upon enrollment. While the 
state’s individual market is much more 
stable currently, signs point to a market 
unable to meet the needs of the popula-
tion, most notably the prominence of high 
deductible health plans.8 In Massachusetts, 
the number of carriers in the individual 
market has increased since the passage of 
the state’s health reforms. The baseline in 
Massachusetts, however, reflected prior 
reform efforts that had reduced the size of 
the individual market and increased premi-
ums for individual policies.  In addressing 
these problems, Massachusetts merged 
its individual and small group markets. A 
large number of carriers offer individual 
coverage in Texas,9 with about 30 likely to 
account for most of the individual market 
business. Across the states, a small number 
of carriers often account for a large part of 
the individual market.  
Short of actually exiting a market, carri-
ers can also change plan benefits designs 
or rating mechanisms, within constraints 
established by state regulatory systems. In 
some cases, market exits could indicate a 
carrier’s determination that the regulatory 
climate or business opportunities are no 
longer favorable, but it can also reflect a 
carrier’s inability to perform efficiently or 
offer a quality product. There was general 
agreement among meeting participants that 
some, possibly many, “marginal” carriers, 
including plans with very small enrollment 
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Summary of Warning Signals of Market Destabilization from 
Lists Submitted by Meeting Participants 
•  Insurers surrendering licenses 
•  Closing blocks of business
•  More assumption reinsurance
•  Changes in marketing
•  Complaints (brokers, consumers)
• Demographic changes in coverage (sudden declines in coverage)
• Increased applications to state high risk pools 
•  Premium volatility
•  Benefit design changes (offering only high-deductible plans)
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and plans offering low quality products 
will not survive after the PPACA insur-
ance reforms are fully in place regardless 
of MLR standards. Some meeting partici-
pants suggested that this sort of market 
exit should serve to strengthen, rather 
than destabilize, the individual market 
post 2014.  Others noted that during 
the transition, individuals who may have 
enrolled in these plans based on personal 
preferences may be unable to find an 
acceptable alternative coverage option.
Market Contraction
In reviewing the characteristics of unstable 
markets, meeting participants focused 
on the difficulty of clearly defining even 
seemingly obvious indicators such as 
“exiting a market.” Meeting participants 
identified several early warning signals of 
market contraction, including the “nuclear 
option,” when carriers formally exit a 
market for new sales and terminate exist-
ing blocks of business. Other signals may 
be increases in assumption reinsurance, 
where carriers selling guaranteed-renew-
able policies arrange for another organi-
zation to completely assume the risk for 
these products, and, in some cases, selling 
blocks of business to companies (some-
times referred to as “vulture companies”) 
that specialize in closing them down and 
“running off the business.”  
These potentially destabilizing actions 
generally require some form of notifica-
tion to the state, if not formal approval, 
by state regulators. Some may also be 
subject to federal oversight, but meeting 
participants indicated that there are areas 
of uncertainty regarding responsibility for 
oversight. They generally agreed, however, 
that brokers actually working in the field 
are among the first to know about poten-
tial problems, and that state insurance reg-
ulators can obtain market intelligence by 
maintaining close contact with them. Calls 
or complaints from brokers and from 
consumers can provide early warning to 
insurance regulators, but whether market 
contractions are destabilizing requires an 
understanding of the local context.  
Market Volatility
Large changes in premium rates or MLRs 
could signal structural problems in the indi-
vidual market.  Some of this movement is 
normal in the market, due to changes in 
product offerings, economic and demo-
graphic, and regulatory changes. Actuaries 
and industry analysts participating in the 
HCFO session agreed that while MLRs tend 
to be stable over time among the large car-
riers, highly-regarded insurers often have 
significant fluctuation in MLRs from year to 
year. But rapid changes could also indicate 
long-term issues in plan financial viability. 
Changes in marketing activity can also signal 
problems in markets. For example, rather 
than terminating a block of business, an 
insurer might suddenly stop actively market-
ing it, and phase out or terminate entirely any 
arrangements to make a particular product 
available through brokers.  
Financial analysts evaluating insurance 
markets also look at indicators such as 
MLRs and premiums, along with various 
aspects of capital investment. The stock 
market may provide a general indica-
tion of how investors think that health 
insurance companies will fare under 
health reform, but does not provide a lot 
of insight about the individual market, 
because the individual insurance seg-
ment generally represents a small part of 
companies’ total business. Publicly traded 
companies tend to be larger and their 
experience and outlook may therefore 
not be indicative of smaller companies. 
Analysts view the MLR standards as a cap 
on profit rates, but the general industry 
outlook is positive because the market 
believes that so many more people will 
be insured in the private markets in 2014. 
But at the same time, some analysts 
express concerns over the strength of the 
coverage requirement in ensuring a well-
balanced risk pool when the long-term 
insurance market reforms requiring “guar-
antee issue” of coverage begin. Wall Street 
does watch for sudden shocks, such as the 
sharp changes in premiums announced or 
proposed recently by several major carri-
ers. These provide insights into ways that 
insurers are positioning their business, 
and, in a broader context, how markets 
are viewed from the different perspectives 
of investors, carriers, and regulators.
Monitoring Markets and 
Protecting Consumers
Some rapid changes in the individual mar-
ket can be identified in the data reported 
to states and/or NAIC, but there is gener-
ally some lag time as data are compiled and 
organized for analysis. For example, plan 
data for a given year are generally available 
from NAIC shortly after the filing deadline 
of April of the following year. The NAIC 
is working with HHS to develop standard 
definitions, uniform methodologies for calcu-
lating the MLR, and reporting forms. These 
will produce valid, reliable data on insurance 
rate filing across the states, including the 
data to calculate MLRs.10 But until these 
systems are in place, regulators will need to 
sort through data that are often unverified 
as well as incomplete. In addition, there are 
also only a small number of publicly available 
data sets that include information on private 
sector enrollees’ demographic characteristics, 
such as data needed for risk adjustment col-
lected in Massachusetts.11 The implementa-
tion of the risk adjustment provisions of the 
PPACA will mean that data will be collected 
in the future, but in the transition period spe-
cial studies may be needed. 
Because the individual market is small, 
identifying changes in demographics, such 
as significant increases in numbers of 
people having problems obtaining cover-
age in the private market, or changes in 
the health status or medical risk of people 
entering or leaving the individual market 
may require special surveys.
Meeting participants repeatedly focused on 
substantive differences between the current 
state of individual insurance market and the 
new environment that will emerge when 
reforms are fully in place in 2014. During the 
transition period, the absence of consistent 
definitions or data, and fundamental dif-
ferences in the types of insurance products 
available to consumer in the individual 
markets in each state will mean that state 
regulators will need to apply considerable 
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judgment, rooted in understanding of local 
circumstances, to appropriately recognize 
when a market is at risk of destabilizing.  
The diversity of state experience 
could, however, provide an advan-
tage.  Participants identified a variety of 
approaches that states have taken to pro-
tect consumers in the individual markets 
short of mandating guaranteed issue of 
all products sold in the individual market. 
Examples included:
•  Extending continuous coverage protec-
tion to consumers stranded by a market 
exit to allow them to obtain similar 
coverage from other carriers without 
pre-existing condition exclusions;
•  Guaranteed issue for some individuals 
for some products; 
•  Periodic (open season) guaranteed issue 
for some (or all) individuals for some 
products;  
•  Requiring that Blue Cross Blue Shield 
plans serve as “insurers of last resort”; 
•  Requiring HMOs to offer some form 
of individual coverage;
•  Requiring carriers with relatively large 
blocks of business to continue market-
ing individual coverage; and
•  Opening state high-risk pools to all 
qualified uninsured individuals, not just 
those who are medically eligible.12
Meeting participants also pointed to the 
need for identifying the potential unin-
tended consequences of these measures.  
These include, for example, the risk that 
these measures could increase the cost 
of coverage for those not at risk of los-
ing coverage due to the MLR ratios. 
Alternative policies need to be weighed 
against other potential options such as 
the development of a transition plan that 
could help prevent destabilization of the 
individual market in the first instance. 
The timeframe to address possible disrup-
tions in markets, and in insurance coverage 
for at-risk populations is short. Problems 
that arise in individual insurance markets 
will reflect local circumstances, increasing 
the burden on already busy state regulatory 
agencies. The federal government could, as 
meeting participants suggested, help states 
through the transition by providing guidance 
about the definitions, standards and data to 
guide decisions about market stability. But 
many participants also called for increased 
communication that would allow states 
to address problems, quickly, and without 
unnecessary bureaucratic impediments.  
Participants were clearly interested in sharing 
information about the options that might be 
available to states to mitigate possible disrup-
tions in coverage over the next few years, 
whether due to general instability of the 
individual insurance market or more specific 
issues related to the new MLR standards. 
They also identified a need to better under-
stand the capacity of state high-risk pools, 
both those already in place and new systems 
established under the PPACA, to absorb 
consumers stranded by market exits. 
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